What Is Sybil Attack? How Blockchain Protected Against It ...

Eth 2.0 vs Polkadot and other musings by a fundamental investor

Spent about two hours on this post and I decided it would help the community if I made it more visible. Comment was made as a response to this
I’m trying to avoid falling into a maximalist mindset over time. This isn’t a 100% ETH question, but I’m trying to stay educated about emerging tech.
Can someone help me see the downsides of diversifying into DOTs?
I know Polkadot is more centralized, VC backed, and generally against our ethos here. On chain governance might introduce some unknown risks. What else am I missing?
I see a bunch of posts about how Ethereum and Polkadot can thrive together, but are they not both L1 competitors?
Response:
What else am I missing?
The upsides.
Most of the guys responding to you here are full Eth maxis who drank the Parity is bad koolaid. They are married to their investment and basically emotional / tribal in an area where you should have a cool head. Sure, you might get more upvotes on Reddit if you do and say what the crowd wants, but do you want upvotes and fleeting validation or do you want returns on your investment? Do you want to be these guys or do you want to be the shareholder making bank off of those guys?
Disclaimer: I'm both an Eth whale and a Dot whale, and have been in crypto for close to a decade now. I originally bought ether sub $10 after researching it for at least a thousand hours. Rode to $1500 and down to $60. Iron hands - my intent has always been to reconsider my Eth position after proof of stake is out. I invested in the 2017 Dot public sale with the plan of flipping profits back to Eth but keeping Dots looks like the right short and long term play now. I am not a trader, I just take a deep tech dive every couple of years and invest in fundamentals.
Now as for your concerns:
I know Polkadot is more centralized
The sad truth is that the market doesn't really care about this. At all. There is no real statistic to show at what point a coin is "decentralized" or "too centralized". For example, bitcoin has been completely taken over by Chinese mining farms for about five years now. Last I checked, they control above 85% of the hashing power, they just spread it among different mining pools to make it look decentralized. They have had the ability to fake or block transactions for all this time but it has never been in their best interest to do so: messing with bitcoin in that way would crash its price, therefore their bitcoin holdings, their mining equipment, and their company stock (some of them worth billions) would evaporate. So they won't do it due to economics, but not because they can't.
That is the major point I want to get across; originally Bitcoin couldn't be messed with because it was decentralized, but now Bitcoin is centralized but it's still not messed with due to economics. It is basically ChinaCoin at this point, but the market doesn't care, and it still enjoys over 50% of the total crypto market cap.
So how does this relate to Polkadot? Well fortunately most chains - Ethereum included - are working towards proof of stake. This is obviously better for the environment, but it also has a massive benefit for token holders. If a hostile party wanted to take over a proof of stake chain they'd have to buy up a massive share of the network. The moment they force through a malicious transaction a proof of stake blockchain has the option to fork them off. It would be messy for a few days, but by the end of the week the hostile party would have a large amount of now worthless tokens, and the proof of stake community would have moved on to a version of the blockchain where the hostile party's tokens have been slashed to zero. So not only does the market not care about centralization (Bitcoin example), but proof of stake makes token holders even safer.
That being said, Polkadot's "centralization" is not that far off to Ethereum. The Web3 foundation kept 30% of the Dots while the Ethereum Foundation kept 17%. There are whales in Polkadot but Ethereum has them too - 40% of all genesis Ether went to 100 wallets, and many suspect that the original Ethereum ICO was sybiled to make it look more popular and decentralized than it really was. But you don't really care about that do you? Neither do I. Whales are a fact of life.
VC backed
VCs are part of the crypto game now. There is no way to get rid of them, and there is no real reason why you should want to get rid of them. They put their capital at risk (same as you and me) and seek returns on their investment (same as you and me). They are both in Polkadot and Ethereum, and have been for years now. I have no issue with them as long as they don't play around with insider information, but that is another topic. To be honest, I would be worried if VCs did not endorse chains I'm researching, but maybe that's because my investing style isn't chasing hype and buying SUSHI style tokens from anonymous (at the time) developers. That's just playing hot potato. But hey, some people are good at that.
As to the amount of wallets that participated in the Polkadot ICO: a little known fact is that more individual wallets participated in Polkadot's ICO than Ethereum's, even though Polkadot never marketed their ICO rounds due to regulatory reasons.
generally against our ethos here
Kool aid.
Some guy that works(ed?) at Parity (who employs what, 200+ people?) correctly said that Ethereum is losing its tech lead and that offended the Ethereum hivemind. Oh no. So controversial. I'm so personally hurt by that.
Some guy that has been working for free on Ethereum basically forever correctly said that Polkadot is taking the blockchain tech crown. Do we A) Reflect on why he said that? or B) Rally the mob to chase him off?
"I did not quit social media, I quit Ethereum. I did not go dark, I just left the community. I am no longer coordinating hard forks, building testnets, or contributing otherwise. I did not work on Polkadot, I never did, I worked on Ethereum. I did not hate Ethereum, I loved it."
Also Parity locked their funds (and about 500+ other wallets not owned by them) and proposed a solution to recover them. When the community voted no they backed off and did not fork the chain, even if they had the influence to do so. For some reason this subreddit hates them for that, even if Parity did the 100% moral thing to do. Remember, 500+ other teams or people had their funds locked, so Parity was morally bound to try its best to recover them.
Its just lame drama to be honest. Nothing to do with ethos, everything to do with emotional tribalism.
Now for the missing upsides (I'll also respond to random fragments scattered in the thread):
This isn’t a 100% ETH question, but I’m trying to stay educated about emerging tech.
A good quick intro to Eth's tech vs Polkadot's tech can be found on this thread, especially this reply. That thread is basically mandatory reading if you care about your investment.
Eth 2.0's features will not really kick in for end users until about 2023. That means every dapp (except DeFI, where the fees make sense due to returns and is leading the fee market) who built on Eth's layer 1 are dead for three years. Remember the trading card games... Gods Unchained? How many players do you think are going to buy and sell cards when the transaction fee is worth more than the cards? All that development is now practically worthless until it can migrate to its own shard. This story repeats for hundreds of other dapp teams who's projects are now priced out for three years. So now they either have to migrate to a one of the many unpopulated L2 options (which have their own list of problems and risks, but that's another topic) or they look for another platform, preferably one interoperable with Ethereum. Hence Polkadot's massive growth in developer activity. If you check out https://polkaproject.com/ you'll see 205 projects listed at the time of this post. About a week ago they had 202 listed. That means about one team migrated from another tech stack to build on Polkadot every two days, and trust me, many more will come in when parachains are finally activated, and it will be a complete no brainer when Polkadot 2.0 is released.
Another huge upside for Polkadot is the Initial Parachain Offerings. Polkadot's version of ICOs. The biggest difference is that you can vote for parachains using your Dots to bind them to the relay chain, and you get some of the parachain's tokens in exchange. After a certain amount of time you get your Dots back. The tokenomics here are impressive: Dots are locked (reduced supply) instead of sold (sell pressure) and you still earn your staking rewards. There's no risk of scammers running away with your Ether and the governance mechanism allows for the community to defund incompetent devs who did not deliver what was promised.
Wouldn’t an ETH shard on Polkadot gain a bunch of scaling benefits that we won’t see natively for a couple years?
Yes. That is correct. Both Edgeware and Moonbeam are EVM compatible. And if the original dapp teams don't migrate their projects someone else will fork them, exactly like SUSHI did to Uniswap, and how Acala is doing to MakerDao.
Although realistically Ethereum has a 5 yr headstart and devs haven't slowed down at all
Ethereum had a five year head start but it turns out that Polkadot has a three year tech lead.
Just because it's "EVM Compatible" doesn't mean you can just plug Ethereum into Polkadot or vica versa, it just means they both understand Ethereum bytecode and you can potentially copy/paste contracts from Ethereum to Polkadot, but you'd still need to add a "bridge" between the 2 chains, so it adds additional complexity and extra steps compared to using any of the existing L2 scaling solutions
That only applies of you are thinking from an Eth maximalist perspective. But if you think from Polkadot's side, why would you need to use the bridge back to Ethereum at all? Everything will be seamless, cheaper, and quicker once the ecosystem starts to flourish.
I see a bunch of posts about how Ethereum and Polkadot can thrive together, but are they not both L1 competitors?
They are competitors. Both have their strategies, and both have their strengths (tech vs time on the market) but they are clearly competing in my eyes. Which is a good thing, Apple and Samsung competing in the cell phone market just leads to more innovation for consumers. You can still invest in both if you like.
Edit - link to post and the rest of the conversation: https://www.reddit.com/ethfinance/comments/iooew6/daily_general_discussion_september_8_2020/g4h5yyq/
Edit 2 - one day later PolkaProject count is 210. Devs are getting the hint :)
submitted by redditsucks_goruqqus to polkadot_market [link] [comments]

[OWL WATCH] Waiting for "IOTA TIME" 27;

Disclaimer: This is my editing, so there could be always some misunderstandings and exaggerations, plus many convos are from 'spec channel', so take it with a grain of salt, pls.
+ I added some recent convos afterward.
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Luigi Vigneri [IF]어제 오후 8:26
Giving the opportunity to everybody to set up/run nodes is one of IOTA's priority. A minimum amount of resources is obviously required to prevent easy attacks, but we are making sure that being active part of the IOTA network can be possible without crazy investments.
we are building our solution in such a way that the protocol is fair and lightweight.

📷
Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:24
IOTA is not "free to use" but it's - fee-less
you have tokens? you can send them around for free
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:25
you have no tokens? you have to pay to use the network
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lekanovic어제 오후 11:25
I think it is a smart way to avoid the spamming network problem
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:26
owning tokens is essentially like owning a share of the actual network
and the throughput it can process
📷
Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:26****​
if you don't need all of that yourself, you can rent it out to people and earn money
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:27
mana = tokens * time since you own them
simplified
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:27
the longer you hold your tokens and the more you have, the more mana you have
but every now and then you have to move them to "realize" that mana
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lekanovic어제 오후 11:28
Is there any other project that is using a Mana solution to the network fee problem ?
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:28
nah
the problem with current protocol is that they are leader based
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:29
you need absolute consensus on who the current leaders are and what their influence in the network is
that's how blockchains works
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:29
if two block producers produce 2 blocks at the same time, then you have to choose which one wins
and where everybody attaches their next block to
IOTA works differently and doesn't need to choose a single leader
we therefore have a much bigger flexibility of designing our sybil protection mechanisms
in a way, mana is also supposed to solve the problem of "rewarding" the infrastructure instead of the validators
in blockchain only the miners get all the money
running a node and even if it's one that is used by a lot of people will only cost
you won't get anything back
no fees, nothing
the miners get it all
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:31
in IOTA, the node operators receive the mana
which gives them a share of the network throughput
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:32
because in blockchain you need to decide whose txs become part of the blocks
and it's not really based on networking protocols like AIMD
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lekanovic어제 오후 11:33
And the more Mana your node have, the more trust your node has and you have more to say in the FPC, is that correct?
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:33
yeah
a node that has processed a lot of txs of its users will have more mana than other nodes
and therefore a bigger say in deciding conflicts
its a direct measure of "trust" by its users
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lekanovic어제 오후 11:34
And choosing committee for dRNG would be done on L1 protocol level?
Everything regarding Mana will be L1 level, right?
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:35
Yeah
Mana is layer1, but will also be used as weight in L2 solutions like smart contracts
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lekanovic어제 오후 11:35
And you are not dependant on using SC to implement this
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:35
No, you don't need smart contracts
That's all the base layer
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:37
'Time' actually takes into account things like decay
So it doesn't just increase forever
It's close to "Demurrage" in monetary theory
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lekanovic어제 오후 11:36
For projects to be able to connect to Polkadot or Cosmos, you need to get the state of the ledger.
Will it be possible to get the Tangle state?
If this would be possible, then I think it would be SUPER good for IOTA
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:38
Yeah but polkadot is not connecting other dlts
Just inhouse stuff
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Hyperware어제 오후 11:39
Is there still a cap on mana so that the rich don't get richer?
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:39
Yes mana is capped
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TangleAccountant어제 오후 11:39
u/Hans Moog [IF] My first thought is that the evolution of this renting system will lead to several big mana renting companies that pool together tons of token holders mana. That way businesses looking to rent mana just need to deal with a reliable mana renting company for years instead of a new individual every couple of months (because life happens and you don't know if that individual will need to sell their IOTAs due to personal reasons). Any thoughts on this?
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:41
u/TangleAccountant yes that is likely - but also not a bad thing - token holders will have a place to get their monthly payout and the companies that want to use the tangle without having tokens have a place to pay
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TangleAccountant어제 오후 11:42
Oh I completely agree. That's really cool. I'll take a stab at creating one of those companies in the US.
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:42
And everybody who wants to run a node themselves or has tokens and wants use the tangle for free can do so
But "leachers" that would want to use the network for free won't be able to do so
I mean ultimately there will always be "fees", as there is no "free lunch".
You have a certain amount of resources that a network can process and you have a certain demand.
And that will naturally result in fees based on supply / demand
what you can do however is to build a system where the actual users of that system that legitimately want to use it can do so for free,
just because they already "invest" enough by having tokens
or running infrastructure
they are already contributing to the well-being of the network through these two aspects alone
it would be stupid to ask those guys for additional fees
and mana essentially tries to be such a measure of honesty among the users
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Hyperware어제 오후 11:47
It's interesting from an investment perspective that having tokens/mana is like owning a portion of the network.
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:48
Yeah, you are owning a certain % of the throughput and whatever the price will ultimately be to execute on this network - you will earn proportionally
but you have to keep in mind that we are trying to build the most efficient DLT that you could possibly ever build
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semibaron어제 오후 11:48
The whole mana (tokens) = share of network throuput sounds very much like EOS tbh
Just that EOS uses DPoS
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:50
yeah i mean there is really not too many new things under the sun - you can just tweak a few things here and there, when it comes to distributing resources
DPoS is simply not very nice from a centralization aspect
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:50
at least not the way EOS does it
delegating weights is 1 thing
but assuming that the weight will always be in a way that 21 "identities" run the whole network is bad
in the current world you see a centralization of power
but ultimately we want to build a future where the wealth is more evenly distributed
and the same goes for voting power
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:52
blockchain needs leader selection
it only works with such a centralizing component
IOTA doesn't need that
it's delusional to say that IOTA wouldn't have any such centralization
but maybe we get better than just a handselected nodes 📷
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Phantom3D어제 오후 11:52
How would this affect a regular hodler without a node. Should i keep my tokens elsewere to generate mana and put the tokens to use?
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:53
you can do whatever you want with your mana
just make an account at a node you regularly use and use it to build up a reputation with that node
to be able to use your funds for free
or run a node yourself
or rent it out to companies if you just hodl
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semibaron어제 오후 11:54
Will there be a build-in function into the node software / wallet to delegate ("sell") my mana?
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Hans Moog [IF]어제 오후 11:55
u/semibaron not from the start - that would happen on a 2nd layer
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dom어제 오후 9:49
suddenly be incentive to hold iota?
to generate Mana
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Hyperware오늘 오전 4:21
The only thing I can really do, is believe that the IF have smart answers and are still building the best solutions they can for the sake of the vision
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dom오늘 오전 4:43
100% - which is why we're spending so much effort to communicate it more clearly now
we'll do an AMA on this topic very soon
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M [s2]오늘 오전 4:54
u/dom​ please accept my question for the AMA: will IOTA remain a permissionless system and if so, how?
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dom오늘 오전 4:57
of course it remains permissionless
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dom오늘 오전 5:20
what is permissioned about it?
is ETH or Bitcoin permissioned because you have to pay a transaction fee in their native token?
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Gerrit오늘 오전 5:24
How did your industry partners think about the mana solution and the fact they need to hold the token to ensure network throughput?
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dom오늘 오전 5:26
u/Gerrit considering how the infrastructure, legal and regulatory frameworks are improving around the adoption and usage of crypto-currencies within large companies, I really think that we are introducing this concept exactly at the right time. It should make enterprise partners comfortable in using the permissionless network without much of a hurdle. They can always launch their own network if they want to ...
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Gerrit오늘 오전 5:27
Launching their own network can’t be what you want
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dom오늘 오전 5:27
exactly
but that is what's happening with Ethereum and all the other networks
they don't hold Ether tokens either.
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Gerrit오늘 오전 5:32
Will be very exciting to see if ongoing regulation will „allow“ companies to invest and hold the tokens. With upcoming custody solutions that would be a fantastic play.
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Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 5:34
It's still possible to send transactions even without mana - mana is only used in times of congestion to give the people that have more mana more priority
there will still be sharding to keep the network free most of the time
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Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 5:35
but without a protection mechanism, somebody could just spam a lot of bullshit and you could break the network(수정됨)
you need some form of protection from this
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M [s2]오늘 오전 5:36
u/Hans Moog [IF] so when I have 0 Mana, I can still send transactions? This is actually the point where it got strange...
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Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 5:37
yes you can
unless the network is close to its processing capabilities / being attacked by spammers
then the nodes will favor the mana holders
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Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 5:37
but having mana is not a requirement for many years to come
currently even people having fpgas can't spam that many tps
and we will also have sharding implemented by then
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M [s2]오늘 오전 5:39
Thank you u/Hans Moog [IF] ! This is the actually important piece of info!
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Basha오늘 오전 5:38
ok, i thought it was communicated that you need at least 1 mana to process a transaction.
from the blogpost: "... a node with 0 mana can issue no transactions."
maybe they meant during the congestion**, but if that's the case maybe you should add that**
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Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 5:42
its under the point "Congestion control:"
yeah this only applies to spam attacks
network not overloaded = no mana needed
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Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 5:43
if congested => favor txs from people who have the most skin in the game
but sharding will try to keep the network non-congested most of the time - but there might be short periods of time where an attacker might bring the network close to its limits
and of course its going to take a while to add this, so we need a protection mechanism till sharding is supported(수정됨)
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Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 6:36
I don't have a particular problem with EOS or their amount of validators - the reason why I think blockchain is inferior has really nothing to do with the way you do sybil protection
and with validators I mean "voting nodes"
I mean even bitcoin has less mining pools
and you could compare mining pools to dpos in some sense
where people assign their weight (in that case hashing power) to the corresponding mining pools
so EOS is definitely not less decentralized than any other tech
but having more identities having weight in the decision process definitely makes it harder to corrupt a reasonable fraction of the system and makes it easier to shard
so its desirable to have this property(수정됨)

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Antonio Nardella [IF]오늘 오전 3:36
https://twitter.com/cmcanalytics/status/1310866311929647104?s=19
u/C3PO [92% Cooless] They could also add more git repos instead of the wallet one, and we would probably be #1 there too..
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Disclaimer:
I'm sorry, maybe I'm fueling some confusion through posting this mana-thing too soon,
but, instead of erasing this posting, I'm adding recent convos.
Certain things about mana seem to be not clear, yet.
It would be better to wait for some official clarification.
But, I hope the community gives its full support to IF, 'cause
there could be always some bumps along the untouched, unchartered way.
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Recent Addition;

Billy Sanders [IF]오늘 오후 1:36

It's still possible to send transactions even without mana - mana is only used in times of congestion to give the people that have more mana more priority
u/Hans Moog [IF] Im sorry Hans, but this is false in the current congestion control algorithm. No mana = no transactions. To be honest, we havent really tried to make it work so that you can sent transactions with no mana during ties with no congestion, but I dont see how you can enable this and still maintain the sybil protection required. u/Luigi Vigneri [IF] What do you think?📷

Dave [EF]오늘 오후 2:19

Suggestion: Sidebar, then get back to us with the verdict.(수정됨)📷2📷

dom오늘 오후 2:27

No Mana no tx will definitely not be the case(수정됨)📷5📷7***[오후 2:28]***Billy probably means the previous rate control paper as it was written by Luigi. I'll clarify with them📷

Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오후 2:29

When was this decided u/Billy Sanders [IF] and by whom? Was this discussed at last resum when I wasnt there? The last info that I had was that the congestion control should only kick in when there is congestion?!?***[오후 2:29]***📷 📷 📷📷

Navin Ramachandran [IF]오늘 오후 2:30

Let's sidebar this discussion and return when we have agreement. Dave has the right idea

submitted by btlkhs to Iota [link] [comments]

16 000 users right now on /r/btc. What's going on?

submitted by knight222 to btc [link] [comments]

Landing page 1/2

US - PUBLIC SYSTEM (USPS)

other.arkitech 2017-2020

Running version: alpha-22 481bd8fd3d85e61f1ec5be37572dc2f47b23e40b81cdb7ae1797e35c7f782c51 2020-05-08 Main-net: Nodes Accounts Software: Release notes Setup instructions Linux / Windows OS Image Raspberry Pi

TL; DR;

A multi-coin platform with enhanced trading capabilities. For the shake of privacy and self-managed societies.

Overview

An anonymous distributed P2P system based on a flat organization of nodes contributing to secure a database in a way that:
The Public System
The Private System

Values


submitted by other_arkitech to US_Public_System [link] [comments]

Continuous Proof of Bitcoin Burn: trust minimized sidechains and bitcoin-pegs w/o oracles/federations today

Original design presented for discussion and criticism
originally posted here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5212814.0
TLDR: Proposing the following that's possible today to use for any existing or new altcoins:
_______________________________________

Disclaimer:

This is not an altcoin thread. I'm not making anything. The design discussed options for existing altcoins and new ways to built on top of Bitcoin inheriting some of its security guarantees. 2 parts: First, the design allows any altcoins to switch to securing themselves via Bitcoin instead of their own PoW or PoS with significant benefits to both altcoins and Bitcoin (and environment lol). Second, I explain how to create Bitcoin-pegged assets to turn altcoins into a Bitcoin sidechain equivalent. Let me know if this is of interest or if it exists, feel free to use or do anything with this, hopefully I can help.

Issue:

Solution to first few points:

PoW altcoin switching to CPoBB would trade:

PoS altcoin switching to CPoBB would trade:

We already have a permissionless, compact, public, high-cost-backed finality base layer to build on top - Bitcoin! It will handle sorting, data availability, finality, and has something of value to use instead of capital or energy that's outside the sidechain - the Bitcoin coins. The sunk costs of PoW can be simulated by burning Bitcoin, similar to concept known as Proof of Burn where Bitcoin are sent to unspendable address. Unlike ICO's, no contributors can take out the Bitcoins and get rewards for free. Unlike PoS, entry into supply lies outside the alt-chain and thus doesn't depend on permission of alt-chain stake-coin holders. It's hard to find a more bandwidth or state size protective blockchain to use other than Bitcoin as well so altcoins can be Bitcoin-aware at little marginal difficulty - 10 years of history fully validates in under a day.

What are typical issues with Proof of Burn?

Solution:

This should be required for any design for it to stay permissionless. Optional is constant fixed emission rate for altcoins not trying to be money if goal is to maximize accessibility. Since it's not depending on brand new PoW for security, they don't have to depend on massive early rewards giving disproportionate fraction of supply at earliest stage either. If 10 coins are created every block, after n blocks, at rate of 10 coins per block, % emission per block is = (100/n)%, an always decreasing number. Sidechain coin doesn't need to be scarce money, and could maximize distribution of control by encouraging further distribution. If no burners exist in a block, altcoin block reward is simply added to next block reward making emission predictable.
Sidechain block content should be committed in burn transaction via a root of the merkle tree of its transactions. Sidechain state will depend on Bitcoin for finality and block time between commitment broadcasts. However, the throughput can be of any size per block, unlimited number of such sidechains can exist with their own rules and validation costs are handled only by nodes that choose to be aware of a specific sidechain by running its consensus compatible software.
Important design decision is how can protocol determine the "true" side-block and how to distribute incentives. Simplest solution is to always :
  1. Agree on the valid sidechain block matching the merkle root commitment for the largest amount of Bitcoin burnt, earliest inclusion in the bitcoin block as the tie breaker
  2. Distribute block reward during the next side-block proportional to current amounts burnt
  3. Bitcoin fee market serves as deterrent for spam submissions of blocks to validate
e.g.
sidechain block reward is set always at 10 altcoins per block Bitcoin block contains the following content embedded and part of its transactions: tx11: burns 0.01 BTC & OP_RETURN tx56: burns 0.05 BTC & OP_RETURN ... <...root of valid sidechain block version 1> ... tx78: burns 1 BTC & OP_RETURN ... <...root of valid sidechain block version 2> ... tx124: burns 0.2 BTC & OP_RETURN ... <...root of INVALID sidechain block version 3> ...
Validity is deterministic by rules in client side node software (e.g. signature validation) so all nodes can independently see version 3 is invalid and thus burner of tx124 gets no reward allocated. The largest valid burn is from tx78 so version 2 is used for the blockchain in sidechain. The total valid burn is 1.06 BTC, so 10 altcoins to be distributed in the next block are 0.094, 0.472, 9.434 to owners of first 3 transactions, respectively.
Censorship attack would require continuous costs in Bitcoin on the attacker and can be waited out. Censorship would also be limited to on-sidechain specific transactions as emission distribution to others CPoB contributors wouldn't be affected as blocks without matching coin distributions on sidechain wouldn't be valid. Additionally, sidechains can allow a limited number of sidechain transactions to happen via embedding transaction data inside Bitcoin transactions (e.g. OP_RETURN) as a way to use Bitcoin for data availability layer in case sidechain transactions are being censored on their network. Since all sidechain nodes are Bitcoin aware, it would be trivial to include.
Sidechain blocks cannot be reverted without reverting Bitcoin blocks or hard forking the protocol used to derive sidechain state. If protocol is forked, the value of sidechain coins on each fork of sidechain state becomes important but Proof of Burn natively guarantees trust minimized and permissionless distribution of the coins, something inferior methods like obscure early distributions, trusted pre-mines, and trusted ICO's cannot do.
More bitcoins being burnt is parallel to more hash rate entering PoW, with each miner or burner getting smaller amount of altcoins on average making it unprofitable to burn or mine and forcing some to exit. At equilibrium costs of equipment and electricity approaches value gained from selling coins just as at equilibrium costs of burnt coins approaches value of altcoins rewarded. In both cases it incentivizes further distribution to markets to cover the costs making burners and miners dependent on users via markets. In both cases it's also possible to mine without permission and mine at a loss temporarily to gain some altcoins without permission if you want to.
Altcoins benefit by inheriting many of bitcoin security guarantees, bitcoin parties have to do nothing if they don't want to, but will see their coins grow more scarce through burning. The contributions to the fee market will contribute to higher Bitcoin miner rewards even after block reward is gone.

Sidechain Bitcoin-pegs:

What is the ideal goal of the sidechains? Ideally to have a token that has the bi-directionally pegged value to Bitcoin and tradeable ~1:1 for Bitcoin that gives Bitcoin users an option of a different rule set without compromising the base chain nor forcing base chain participants to do anything different.
Issues with value pegs:
Let's get rid of the idea of needing Bitcoin collateral to back pegged coins 1:1 as that's never secure, independent, or scalable at same security level. As drive-chain design suggested the peg doesn't have to be fast, can take months, just needs to exist so other methods can be used to speed it up like atomic swaps by volunteers taking on the risk for a fee.
In continuous proof of burn we have another source of Bitcoins, the burnt Bitcoins. Sidechain protocols can require some minor percentage (e.g. 20%) of burner tx value coins via another output to go to reimburse those withdrawing side-Bitcoins to Bitcoin chain until they are filled. If withdrawal queue is empty that % is burnt instead. Selection of who receives reimbursement is deterministic per burner. Percentage must be kept small as it's assumed it's possible to get up to that much discount on altcoin emissions.
Let's use a really simple example case where each burner pays 20% of burner tx amount to cover withdrawal in exact order requested with no attempts at other matching, capped at half amount requested per payout. Example:
withdrawal queue: request1: 0.2 sBTC request2: 1.0 sBTC request3: 0.5 sBTC
same block burners: tx burns 0.8 BTC, 0.1 BTC is sent to request1, 0.1 BTC is sent to request2 tx burns 0.4 BTC, 0.1 BTC is sent to request1 tx burns 0.08 BTC, 0.02 BTC is sent to request 1 tx burns 1.2 BTC, 0.1 BTC is sent to request1, 0.2 BTC is sent to request2
withdrawal queue: request1: filled with 0.32 BTC instead of 0.2 sBTC, removed from queue request2: partially-filled with 0.3 BTC out of 1.0 sBTC, 0.7 BTC remaining for next queue request3: still 0.5 sBTC
Withdrawal requests can either take long time to get to filled due to cap per burn or get overfilled as seen in "request1" example, hard to predict. Overfilling is not a big deal since we're not dealing with a finite source. The risk a user that chooses to use the sidechain pegged coin takes on is based on the rate at which they can expect to get paid based on value of altcoin emission that generally matches Bitcoin burn rate. If sidechain loses interest and nobody is burning enough bitcoin, the funds might be lost so the scale of risk has to be measured. If Bitcoins burnt per day is 0.5 BTC total and you hope to deposit or withdraw 5000 BTC, it might take a long time or never happen to withdraw it. But for amounts comparable or under 0.5 BTC/day average burnt with 5 side-BTC on sidechain outstanding total the risks are more reasonable.
Deposits onto the sidechain are far easier - by burning Bitcoin in a separate known unspendable deposit address for that sidechain and sidechain protocol issuing matching amount of side-Bitcoin. Withdrawn bitcoins are treated as burnt bitcoins for sake of dividing block rewards as long as they followed the deterministic rules for their burn to count as valid and percentage used for withdrawals is kept small to avoid approaching free altcoin emissions by paying for your own withdrawals and ensuring significant unforgeable losses.
Ideally more matching is used so large withdrawals don't completely block everyone else and small withdrawals don't completely block large withdrawals. Better methods should deterministically randomize assigned withdrawals via previous Bitcoin block hash, prioritized by request time (earliest arrivals should get paid earlier), and amount of peg outstanding vs burn amount (smaller burns should prioritize smaller outstanding balances). Fee market on bitcoin discourages doing withdrawals of too small amounts and encourages batching by burners.
The second method is less reliable but already known that uses over-collateralized loans that create a oracle-pegged token that can be pegged to the bitcoin value. It was already used by its inventors in 2014 on bitshares (e.g. bitCNY, bitUSD, bitBTC) and similarly by MakerDAO in 2018. The upside is a trust minimized distribution of CPoB coins can be used to distribute trust over selection of price feed oracles far better than pre-mined single trusted party based distributions used in MakerDAO (100% pre-mined) and to a bit lesser degree on bitshares (~50% mined, ~50% premined before dpos). The downside is 2 fold: first the supply of BTC pegged coin would depend on people opening an equivalent of a leveraged long position on the altcoin/BTC pair, which is hard to convince people to do as seen by very poor liquidity of bitBTC in the past. Second downside is oracles can still collude to mess with price feeds, and while their influence might be limited via capped price changes per unit time and might compromise their continuous revenue stream from fees, the leverage benefits might outweight the losses. The use of continous proof of burn to peg withdrawals is superior method as it is simply a minor byproduct of "mining" for altcoins and doesn't depend on traders positions. At the moment I'm not aware of any market-pegged coins on trust minimized platforms or implemented in trust minimized way (e.g. premined mkr on premined eth = 2 sets of trusted third parties each of which with full control over the design).
_______________________________________

Brief issues with current altchains options:

  1. PoW: New PoW altcoins suffer high risk of attacks. Additional PoW chains require high energy and capital costs to create permissionless entry and trust minimized miners that are forever dependent on markets to hold them accountable. Using same algorithm or equipment as another chain or merge-mining puts you at a disadvantage by allowing some miners to attack and still cover sunk costs on another chain. Using a different algorithm/equipment requires building up the value of sunk costs to protect against attacks with significant energy and capital costs. Drive-chains also require miners to allow it by having to be sidechain aware and thus incur additional costs on them and validating nodes if the sidechain rewards are of value and importance.
  2. PoS: PoS is permissioned (requires permission from internal party to use network or contribute to consensus on permitted scale), allows perpetual control without accountability to others, and incentivizes centralization of control over time. Without continuous source of sunk costs there's no reason to give up control. By having consensus entirely dependent on internal state network, unlike PoW but like private databases, cannot guarantee independent permissionless entry and thus cannot claim trust minimization. Has no built in distribution methods so depends on safe start (snapshot of trust minimized distributions or PoW period) followed by losing that on switch to PoS or starting off dependent on a single trusted party such as case in all significant pre-mines and ICO's.
  3. Proof of Capacity: PoC is just shifting costs further to capital over PoW to achieve same guarantees.
  4. PoW/PoS: Still require additional PoW chain creation. Strong dependence on PoS can render PoW irrelevant and thus inherit the worst properties of both protocols.
  5. Tokens inherit all trust dependencies of parent blockchain and thus depend on the above.
  6. Embedded consensus (counterparty, veriblock?, omni): Lacks mechanism for distribution, requires all tx data to be inside scarce Bitcoin block space so high cost to users instead of compensated miners. If you want to build a very expressive scripting language, might very hard & expensive to fit into Bitcoin tx vs CPoBB external content of unlimited size in a committed hash. Same as CPoBB is Bitcoin-aware so can respond to Bitcoin being sent but without source of Bitcoins like burning no way to do any trust minimized Bitcoin-pegs it can control fully.

Few extra notes from my talks with people:

Main questions to you:

open to working on this further with others
submitted by awasi868 to CryptoTechnology [link] [comments]

LTB podcasts episodes 419 and 420 (DASH not mentioned by name)

Innovations that come out of the DASH project continue to be overlooked. Subpar qualities of other projects are touted, and problems which DASH has "solved" remain unknown or unspoken.
Let's Talk Bitcoin! #419 Altcoins and Ancient History with Charlie Lee
Charlie Lee talks about why Litecoin is useful. He says compared to BTC, fees are lower and transaction times faster because block times are shorter. He specifically says LTC is used when people want to transfer between exchanges (A use-case that DCG identified in a past quarterly call). Why is DASH not competitive, even though DASH's transactions settle faster (instant) and fees are even lower than LTC?
Let's Talk Bitcoin! #420 How Can Public Blockchains Have Real Privacy?
They talk about privacy, and one of the difficulties for Mimblewimble (and every network) is Sybil attacks - nodes can be spun up at near zero cost, and can gathesurveil MW transactions. They said one way to deal with that is having something at stake, and the example given is having BTC "bonded" in a Lightning Network channel.
But DASH's MN network is specifically designed to resist Sybil attacks (one of the first, if not the first, to do so). I have read codablock talk about DASH's innovation for avoiding Sybil attacks, but rarely elsewhere.
Mimblewimble on DASH was talked about on forums as early as 2016. GrandMasterDash on Dash Forums and DashNexus, explains why MimbleWimble is ideal for DASH:
... MimbleWimble is the best fit for dash. Transactions are carried out via a handshake i.e. the receiving party must sign and reply. It's kind of like receiving an invoice and then you pay. This setup is similar to dash's Blockchain Users i.e. both parties subscribe to each other. Dash's masternode network would be perfect for managing said handshake. The sender, for example, could ask the masternodes to pay someone within 24 hours, or void the transaction if it's not claimed.
A few months ago, Chainlink generated a lot of buzz for having "oracles" linking real-world data to a blockchain. Years ago, Evan cited one of the purposes for Masternodes is to serve as just such "oracles"... Also haven't heard or seen anything about this from Dash News or community.
tldr; It's strange to me that none of these seem to be talked about or known, neither in DASH's community or the wider crypto community. Is the community too small? Does the core team lack knowledge or ability to communicate? Am I just out of touch? What am I missing?
Edit: Is there someone in the Dash community that's well-spoken and technically savvy enough (like Andreas Antonopoulos) that can "promote" DASH? LTB podcast has requested story ideas or interviewees for future podcasts - I wonder if there is anyone that would be suitable to "represent" DASH and talk about its innovations.
All respect to Amanda, Joel, Mark and others but I don't think they are technically savvy enough to speak to DASH's technical innovations (I could be wrong, gladly). How about Darrentapp, Codablock, andyfreer and other devs, or perhaps Bob Carroll - would they be willing to be interviewed? Not sure if "verbal communications" is their strong point. Is there anyone else in the community that would be willing to speak up?
submitted by traderpat to dashpay [link] [comments]

On EOS Blockchain, Vote Buying Is Business as Usual

On EOS Blockchain, Vote Buying Is Business as Usual


Buying votes is a big no-no in traditional democracies, but on the world’s eighth-largest blockchain it’s become an accepted way of doing business.
A new service makes it easier for EOS block producers, the nodes elected by holders of the cryptocurrency to validate transactions on the network, to share their block rewards with those who voted for them. The service, known as Genpool, was introduced this month by GenerEOS, which itself is a block producer candidate.
Back when EOSIO, the software powering the $3.7 billion EOS chain, was just an idea, the crypto community debated whether delegated proof-of-stake, or DPoS, would lead to validation candidates effectively bribing users to support them. (DPoS is a consensus mechanism that limits the number of node validators to a fixed set.) Early on, the EOS community believed it could prevent such activity.
Now the community is all-in on what proponents call “voter rebates.”
"The Genpool platform is a zero barrier to entry free market ecosystem, connecting proxy owners with voters that are looking to support quality Block Producers (BPs) while being rewarded with a percentage of the additional BP income,” GenerEOS said in a Medium post announcing the service.
GenerEOS's Tim Weston declined an interview with CoinDesk.
While similar services have launched in Asia, Genpool appears to be the first in the English-speaking EOS world explicitly designed to help token holders find the best payouts for their votes from block producers. (Like bitcoin (BTC) miners, EOS block producers are rewarded with freshly minted cryptocurrency for recording transactions on the public ledger.) In short, Genpool lets EOS (EOS) holders get paid to participate in governance.
To critics, this fulfills longstanding fears that in a system where governance is delgated, the richest will dominate. Permitting payments makes it even easier for the wealthiest to cement their position.
There is nothing stopping a validator from acting is if it were more than one entity, allowing whales to hold multiple spots on the governing council of block producers, effectively mounting a Sybil attack, the research team at the Binance cryptocurrency exchange wrote in a report released Feb. 18.
"A single actor may register multiple block producer accounts and multiply their voting weight at a negligible cost,” the report said. “Simultaneously, having multiple BP entities allows [that actor] to allocate more block rewards to voters, increasing the competitiveness of the underlying actor."
Binance stopped withdrawals of eos tokens in late January when it saw instability on the network, possibly due to upgrades to the latest version of the EOSIO software released by Block.One. Other exchanges such as Upbit and OKEx paused withdrawals at the time.
submitted by moon525 to u/moon525 [link] [comments]

Dash In 2018: Disappointments, Boondoggles, Scandals, Disasters, & Catastrophes

[The original post was censored in the the paidshill Dash pumping sub Dashpay, where actual discussion beyond "2018 kind of sucked for Dash" is not allowed.] ​
Disappointments
In 2018, Dash failed to be listed on Coinbase while ETC and many other coins were, due to Dash's notorious Instamine, centralized development, and murky Howey Test/SEC Action status.
In 2018, Dash failed be included in the OpenBazaar project, while Monero and several other alts were added.
In 2018, efforts to hype Dash's supposedly impressive 2mb block-based tx/sec rate were crushed and humiliated when DCG's creaky old client hit a crippling software limitation around the same time as BCH and BSV were chewing through 32 and 64 megabyte blocks.
In 2018, Dash's former anti-segwit hero Craig Wright learned new facts about law and concluded Dash is an illegal security, saying so loudly in tweets backed by citations.
In 2018, Wirex and other debit card providers supported Bitcoin and many alts, but not Dash, despite a year of Shrem 2.0 shill talk about integrations 'soon'.
In 2018, Dash Core used Uphold for the "Acquire Dash" part of their Kript mobile plan, but Uphold doesn't work in Venezuela , so that pillar of their strategy was broken.

Boondoggles
In 2018, the FanDuel fiasco wasted a fortune in cash and goodwill, leaving Dash's target market of online gambling to Calvin Ayre's BSV and Roger Ver's BCH blockchains.
In 2018, the DACH Embassy fiasco wasted a fortune in cash and goodwill, as nobody ever really cared about Macrocuck/Simon/Basilpop/Ezra/Fabio running around desperately trying to look busy enough to justify their ridiculous burn rate and poor results.
In 2018, the CoPay fiasco wasted a fortune in cash and goodwill as users and devs suffered an ambush from DCG, leaving the formerly hyped "backbone of Evolution" project instantly retired to abandonware status.
In 2018, the Alt36 train-wreck-in-progress slowly lurched towards its imminent conclusion of causing more toxic FUD and wasting a fortune in cash and goodwill with zero deliverables to show for it.

Scandals
In 2018, fake "Venezuela adoption" news resulted in massive public humiliation as Twitter, cc, and Russia Today (ironically, the home of Dash paidshill Max Keiser) debunked hype that only amounted to useless stickers on greasy cash registers.
In 2018, Evan and Amanda were missing in action, despite Evan's previous promises to develop hardware and support the ecosystem with his vast, intentionally insta-mined fortune.
In 2018, Dash paid to hold a Bitcoin networking event at a Miami strip club, offending so many people (it was a 2nd offence for Dash with strippers at TNABC) the scandal was reported worldwide by Bloomberg, Fortue, Business Insider, etc.
In 2018, knowledge of Dash's instamine became widespread throughout the entire crypto universe and the intentional nature of Evan's faked "bug" excuse became a subject of investigation.
In 2018, Dash cargo cultists reduced themselves to shilling the dwindling number of cherry-picked metrics by which Dash was not failing utterly, such as the absurd "FairCoinValue" and fallacious/irrelevant "ATH Masternode Count" hype.
In 2018, the KuvaCash fiasco turned toxic (wasting a fortune in cash and goodwill) resulting in a kDAO splinter group of venture capitalist MNOs and creating massive Howey Test implications.

Disasters
In 2018, a KuvaNation vs. DACH Force News civil war inflicted mass casualties, leaving a permanent split of the "DGBB" community into non-cooperative Team Tao and Team Joel factions fighting over a shrinking Treasury budget like starving rats.
In 2018, malicious MNOs trolled Dash at the protocol level and on DashCentral, causing chaos at the very end of voting cycles, thus showing the entire world Dash is not resistant to Sybil attack after all.
In 2018, Dash Clown Group Inc failed to live up to its own self-imposed "Agile Development" goals so many times they published one sketchy, final "DRAFT" roadmap, and then quietly abandoned entirely the idea of actually trying to meet deadlines (despite the dash.org page still advertising a Q4 2018 Alpha release).

Catastrophes
In 2018, a single mining pool controlled enough hashpower to prevent a timely upgrade, demonstrating that Dash's PoW is not sufficiently decentralized (due to Bitmain's monopoly on Dash ASICs).
In 2018, www.crypto51.app showed the world Dash is >90% NiceHash-able and thus may be 51% attacked easily and cheaply (<1 BTC per hour), causing Poloniex and other exchanges to require 50 confirmations (rather than using InsantSend).
In 2018, the failures of Dash's X11-based PoW security model and resulting threat of attacks caused Dash to abandon Nakamoto Consensus for a wonky, untested, homespun version of checkpoints (conceding defeat and offering an unconditional "pre-consensus" surrender before an attack even happened).
In 2018, Evolution was not here by NYE (not even an alpha version of a testnet).
In 2018, no amount of brave ThisIsFine talk about buying dips could change the fact that Dash Core Group Inc had to radically downsize due to their customary $935k/month funding being completely unsupportable.

Analysis
Never mind the price drop, even though Dash suffered worse than most of its Top 20 peers and fell in rank from #3 all the way down to #16.
Let's ignore the fact Dash is marketed to investors with the 'Masternode' feature advertised as supposedly stabilizing the price.
Let's also ignore the fact that in 2018 Dash's supposed Sybil-resistance was shown to be inadequate, as blockchain analysis revealed dozens of Masternodes trolling at the protocol level by voting no on all but the infamous DEMOTE RYAN TAYLOR proposal.
Evolution was, after years of delays, complete from-scratch reboots, and blown goals, given one final self-imposed deadline to meet.
Dash's Queen, Amanda of the Used Car Lot, declared she was going have to rethink her position regarding Duff's Instamined Masternode tokens if that deadline wasn't met.
That deadline was midnight Dec 31, 2018.
Now it's the first morning of 2019 and Evolution is nowhere to be seen.
Even worse, Dash Clown Inc is once again making negative progress towards their goals of shipping a test-net version of v13 worth of the term "Release Candidate."
Dash Clown Inc burned through ten (10) un-releasable (because broken) so-called Release Candidates.
Finally the clueless clowns (running around like headless chickens since Andy Freer was fired or rage-quit) gave up on the entire v13 RC branch and went back to tinkering with v12.
No updates to the crucial LLMQ repo have been made since November, when the price drop crushed DCG's budget and Andy suddenly left Evolution to die on the operating table.

Dash in 2018 through the eyes of Reddit's most popular crypto sub
January 2018
Congratulations: Dash out of top 10
https://np.reddit.com/CryptoCurrency/comments/7oq515/congratulations_dash_out_of_top_10/
One of the most prolific scam coins has been beaten out of the top 10 once and for all. For this we can all be grateful.
Evidence for all your downvoters:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xBxbiH_Mg44
https://medium.com/@omiros23/evans-and-dash-s-scam-story-add1f16528ae
https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@thedashguy/the-reason-i-call-dash-a-scam-and-echo-chamber-proof-of-the-crazed-cult-like-thinking-of-dash-community-inside
Today is a good day.
Best comment: "replaced by Tron... oh the irony".

December 2018
KFC Venezuela denies accepting dash as a form of payment
https://np.reddit.com/CryptoCurrency/comments/a56a4e/kfc_venezuela_denies_accepting_dash_as_a_form_of/
** Hi guys, check this news
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=es&sl=es&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.criptonoticias.com%2Fsucesos%2Fkfc-venezuela-desmiente-acepte-dash-como-forma-pago%2F
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccacampbell1/2018/12/07/discussions-in-place-for-dash-to-be-accepted-at-kfc-venezuela/#18baf92c5d38
https://twitter.com/dashmerchant/status/1072327769068052481
Top comment: "Yeah, more bullshit from Dash."

**December 24
Dash doesn't actually look like it is being utilised by Venezuelans. Have a look.
https://np.reddit.com/CryptoCurrency/comments/a96i3y/dash_doesnt_actually_look_like_it_is_being/
https://youtu.be/4tKvqj3U3O0
Most controversial comment: "I dont see how people dont get it. If you cant pay for food, you would invest what little you have into something as risky as crypto ? It is easy to judge from our POV but In reality, most would rather feed their familiy then look for ways to invest in some startup."

Conclusion
The Top Three Dash-related posts at cryptocurrency are a microcosm of Dash's start-to-finish miserable, horrible, terrible year of self-inflicted blunders, money pits, and epoch-ending cataclysms cumulating in the resolution of the Dash experiment and disproving Evan's "Dash is Digital Cash" hypothesis.
Note: The repost is shared here. The original has been censored from Dashpay. https://np.reddit.com/DashUncensored/comments/abvewf/dash_in_2018_disappointments_boondoggles_scandals/
[Dash is such a terrible scam that it needs its own uncensored sub to discuss happenings without incurring the wrath of the MNO and the Dash ponzi leadership/Evan/Amanda. I honestly believe crypto must weed out these ponzi like operations before we can move forward as a collective group]

submitted by tellmesay to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Andreas Antonopoulos gets "Satoshi's Vision" completely wrong and shows his misunderstanding of the system. He thinks 1 cpu 1 vote means 1 user 1 vote, a common mistake from people on the Core side.

In this video at the 6m20s mark Andreas Antonopoulos speaks about Satoshi's vision. He speaks about "1 cpu 1 vote" saying that Satoshi designed the system to be decentralized as possible, but Andreas completely misunderstands the meaning of 1 cpu 1 vote. He is falling into the common trap of conflating 1cpu 1 vote with 1 user 1 vote.
Andreas, haven't you even read nChains paper about POW and Theory of the Firm? A cpu is an economic resource:
One of the little-known aspects of bitcoin is the nature of the proof of work system. There are many people, especially those who support a UASF or PoW change that believe a distributed system should be completed as a mesh. In this, they confuse centralised systems with centrality. The truth of the matter, no matter which proof of work system is implemented, they all follow a maximal growth curve that reflects the nature of the firm as detailed in 1937 by Ronald Coase (1937).
The bitcoin White Paper was very specific. users of the system "vote with their CPU power" [1]. What this means, is that the system was never generated to give one vote per person. It is designed purely around economic incentives individuals with more hash power will have provided more investment into the system. These individuals who invest more in the system gain more say in the system. At the same time, no one or even two individuals can gain complete control of the system. We'll explore the nature of cartels in a separately, but these always fail without government intervention. The reason for cartels failing comes down to the simple incentivisation of the most efficient member. The strongest cartel member always ends up propping up the weakest. This leads to a strategy of defection.
No proof of work-based solution ever allows for a scenario where you have one vote to one person. The anti-sybiling functions of bitcoin and all other related systems based on proof of work or similar derivatives are derived from an investment based strategy. Solutions to the implementation of ASIC based systems are constantly proposed as a methodology of limiting the centralisation of proof of work systems as it is termed. The truth of the matter is that the mining function within any proof of work system naturally aligns to business interests. This leads to corporations running machines within data centres. On the way that democracies and republics have migrated away from small groups of people individually voting for an outcome towards a vote for a party, the transactional costs associated with individual choice naturally leads to corporate solutions. In this, the corporation mirrors a political party.
In this paper, we address the issues of using alternate approval work systems with regards to either incorporating alternate functions in an extension of simply securing the network against the use of proof of work systems to create a one person one vote scenario in place of economic incentivisation. We will demonstrate conclusively that all systems migrate to a state of economic efficiency. The consequence of this is that systems form into groups designed to maximise returns. The effect is that bitcoin is not only incentive compatible but is optimal. No system can efficiently collapse into an order of one vote one individual and remain secure. In the firm-based nature of bitcoin, we demonstrate that the inherent nature of the firm is reflected within mining pools. Multiple aggregation strategies exist. The strategies range from the creation of collective firms where members can easily join or leave (mining pools) through to more standard corporate structures
Proof of Work as it relates to the theory of the firm. that are successful within any proof of work system. The system was determined to be based on one- vote per CPU (Satoshi, 2008) and not one vote per person or one vote per IP address. The reasons for this is simple, there is no methodology available that can solve byzantine consensus on an individual basis. The solution developed within bitcoin solves this economically using investment. The parties signal their intent to remain bound to the protocol through a significant investment. Those parties that follow the protocol are rewarded. The alternative strategy takes us back to the former and failed systems such as e-cash that could not adequately solve Sybil attacks and decentralise the network. Bitcoin manages to maintain the decentralise nature of the network through a requirement that no individual party can ever achieve more than 50% of the network hash rate.
In all proof of work systems, there are requirements to inject a costly signal into the network that is designed as the security control. To many people, they believe that the cryptographic element, namely the hashing process is the security feature of bitcoin. This is a fallacy, it is the economic cost that is relevant to the overall system and not the individual element.
The benefits of a hash function are that they are difficult to solve in the nature of the proof of work algorithm but are easy to verify. This economic asymmetry is one of the key features of bitcoin. Once a user has found a solution, they know it can be quickly broadcast and verified by others. Additionally, the hash algorithm provides a fair distribution system based on the amount of invested hash rate. The distinction from proof of stake solution as has been proposed comes in the requirement to constantly reinvest. A proof of stake system requires a single investment. Once this investment is created, the system is incentivised towards the protection of the earlier investment. This leads to a scenario known as a strategic oligopoly game.
The solution using a proof of work algorithm is the introduction of an ongoing investment. This is different to an oligopoly game in that sunk cost cannot make up for continued investment. In a proof of stake system, prior investment is crystallised allowing continued control with little further investment. Proof of work differs in that it requires continuous investment. More than this, it requires innovation. As with all capitalist systems, they are subject to Schumpeterian dynamical change (Shumpeter, 1994). The system of creative destruction allows for cycles of innovation. Each innovation leads to waves of creation over the destruction of the old order.
This process creates continued growth. Proof of work-based systems continue to grow and continue to update and change. Any incumbent corporation or other entity needs to continue to invest knowing that their continued dominance is not assured. In bitcoin, we have seen innovative leaps as people moved from CPU-based mining into GPU-based systems. This initial innovation altered the software structure associated with the mining process in bitcoin. That change significantly altered the playing field leading to novel techniques associated with FPGAs and later ASICs dedicated to a specific part of the mining process.
The error held by many people is that this move from a CPU-based solution into more costly implementations could have been averted. A consequence of this has been the introduction of alternative proof of work systems into many of the alt-coins
These systems have been implemented without the understanding that it is not the use of ASICs that is an issue. It is that the belief that individual users can individually mine in a mesh system will be able to be implemented as a successful proof of work. In the unlikely event that a specialised algorithm was implemented that could only run once on any one machine CPU, it would still lead to the eventual creation of corporate data centres for mining. In the section above, we showed using Arrow’s theorem how only a single use proof of work system can be effective. If we extend this and look at the Theory of the Firm (Coase, 1937) we note that in a system in Litecoin and Dogecoin for example. A00137:
Proof of Work as it relates to the theory of the firm. of prices, reduction could be carried out without any organisation. One issue against this arises from the cost of information. Interestingly, as we move into a world of increasingly more information, it becomes scarce information that is important. As the amount of information becomes more voluminous, the ability to uncover accurate and timely information becomes scarcer. The ability to specialise in the coordination of the various factors of production and the distribution of information leads towards vertical integration within firms. We see this first voiced in Adam Smith’s (Smith, 1776) postulation on the firm:
Everyone can choose to either seek further information or act on the information that they already have. This information can be in the form of market knowledge, product knowledge, or expertise, but at some point, the individual needs to decide to act. There is a cost to obtaining information. The returns on obtaining more information hit a maximum level and start to decrease at a certain point. The entrepreneur acts as a guiding influence managing the risk associated with incomplete information compared to the risk of not acting but rather waiting to obtain more information.
In the instance of bitcoin mining, the firm can increase in size through the integration of multiple specialist roles. Even given the assumption that any one process can run on but a single CPU, we come to the scenario of high-end datacentre servers. The Intel Xeon Phi 7290f implements 72 Atom CPU Cores. Each core runs two threads. Even taking the control system into account, this leaves 142 processes able to run per system. With four cards per RU this allows for datacentre implementations of 5,964 mining processes to run on a pure CPU-based proof of work implementation. One person can manage a small number of mining server implementations within a home or small business environment. In large data centre-based organisations such as Facebook, a single administrator can run 20,000 servers
The effect of this would be one individual managing 2,840,000 individual CPU-based mining processes. This alone is outside the scaling capabilities of any individual. This can be further enhanced as cost savings through the creation of large data centres, management savings and integrating multiple network and systems administrators is considered. As we start to add additional layers we come to a maximum where it is no longer profitable to grow the firm in size. Right up until that point, the firm will grow.
submitted by cryptorebel to btc [link] [comments]

List of reasons why CTOR (pushed by Bitmain ABC) is bad

For those who don't know, CTOR is one of many possible artificial sorting methods that could be imposed on a set of transactions within a block. Any sorting algorithm is naturally slower than the act of constructing an unsorted list. Let that sink in for a while.
That said, here is the list of reasons why I personally think CTOR has no place in the protocol of Bitcoin Cash.
When using the natural ordering, the order of TXs in a block will increasingly differ between two independent miners as one of the miners becomes poorly connected to the network. A miner connected poorly to the network is more likely to fall a victim to a Sybil attack (if they already haven't). If we could detect this condition as early as possible it is possible to preemptively orphan discrepant blocks and thus thwart the double-spend attacks.
A more safe and reliable network makes Bitcoin Cash more useful and thus increases its adoption. As a result, the price of BCH increases and miners will earn more. Thus, it is in the best interest of miners to cooperate and together provide better service to the users. CTOR is a step away from this direction and should be rejected.
submitted by 1Hyena to btc [link] [comments]

Harmony Staking System

Staking-based Sharding Validator Registration Sybil attack prevention is a key security consideration in public blockchains. Bitcoin and Ethereum require the miners to compute a cryptographic puzzle (PoW) before they can propose a block. Similarly, sharding-based blockchains like Zilliqa or Quarkchain also use PoW to prevent Sybil attacks. Harmony adopts a different approach with proof-of-stake (PoS) as the validator registration or Sybil attack prevention mechanism. In order to become a Harmony validator, prospective participants (or stakers) have to stake a certain amount of tokens to be eligible. The number of tokens staked will determine the number of voting shares assigned to the validator. Each voting share corresponds to one vote in the BFT consensus.
A voting share is a virtual ticket that allows a validator to cast one vote in the consensus. Validators can acquire voting shares by staking tokens. The amount of tokens required for a voting share is algorithmically adjusted. At the beginning of each epoch, new validators’ voting shares will be randomly assigned to shards. The new validators join the shard(s) where their voting shares get assigned. As discussed in §2, the consensus in a shard is reached by validators who collectively possess at least 2 f + 1 voting shares to sign the block.
To guarantee the security of a single shard, the amount of voting shares by malicious validators needs to be kept below 31 of all the voting shares in that shard. This is required due to the nature of BFT consensus. Harmony’s adaptive thresholded PoS guarantees the above security requirement by adaptively adjusting the price of a voting share and assigning individual voting shares to shards rather than individual validators.
For more information: https://harmony.one/
submitted by incredulous97 to harmony_one [link] [comments]

How vulnerable is Dash to sybil attacks?

One of the big reasons why people still favor Bitcoin over Dash is because of its huge hash-rate. Do they have a point? Does the MN network on top of Dash provide any extra security?
submitted by RavenDothKnow to dashpay [link] [comments]

Improving the Exchange Situation

The exchange situation for cryptocurrency right now is pretty lopsided. Exchanges have a lot of power, meaning they can command dev support, payment from coin owners, and ultimately decide who gets to be traded and who doesn't.
I don't think this is a good thing for cryptocurrency. We can do better than that.
A lot of people were calling for a community donation to be set up to get listed on Binance. Binance never told us how much money they want for us to get listed, they actually asked instead how much we'd be willing to pay in order to get listed. That's pretty gross in my opinion, and it's not something we should encourage by raising money to pay them.
Instead, we could use that same large amount of money to pay developers to build a decentralized exchange. No more threats of being de-listed, no more closed signups, no more wondering if the exchange is solvent or at risk of having all of their coins stolen, and mostly, no more relying on centralized decision makers who hold all the power in these types of situations.
Some new (I believe yet unreleased) cryptography would allow Siacoin to do atomic swaps with Bitcoin, no soft fork needed. Even if that ends up not working out, we can also use incremental lightning network payments to perform the same thing.
That means we could have a decentralized exchange where you don't need escrow, you just find the person with the best price, and then you can do an automatic, safe, cross-chain coin trade. That's powerful stuff, and I think that if we're going to pull a bunch of money together to do something about exchanges, we should take the decentralized route.
I'm guessing that the atomic swaps code itself would only take 1 cryptographer about 3 months to implement. Once finished, you'd be able to perform safe Sia/Bitcoin atomic swaps with untrusted counterparties as long as you were running both a full Sia node and also a full Bitcoin node. You'd be able to pay Bitcoin to receive Siacoin, or vice-versa.
At the same time, we would build a platform where market makers could announce themselves, the same way that hosts announce themselves on the Sia chain. The market maker would announce supported coin-pairs, and then users would reach out to all of the market makers for the trade they want to make, until they found the market maker with the best price. I'm not 100% sure the best mechanics yet, but I'm thinking market makers could announce themselves with a proof of burn, the same way that the hosts do, which would prevent Sybil attacks.
All told I think we'd need 6-12 months to get a decentralized exchange operational, and about 3 people working on it full time. If we find the right people, that's only about $500,000 to build to completion. If people are interested in paying to get listed on a new exchange, my strong vote would be that we look into either some of the existing decentralized exchanges, or that we look into building our own.
It's high time cryptocurrency had a proper decentralized exchange, and I think it's something our community could fund.
submitted by Taek42 to siacoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin is the fake Skycoin

Satoshi Nakamoto said that biggest flaw in Bitcoin network are miners. That's because consensus algorithm, TX hash rate is dependent on miners calculation. Basically, we are consuming a lot of electricity to gather multiple tx in a block, in order to 3 Chinese mining pools can smash that block and take the Bitcoin reward. And if is not enough, the mining pools can inject fake tx in the network to clog it, so TX fees for us (peasants) will go higher.
  1. Why we are using hardware and electricity to create one block?
  2. Why Consensus algorithm is dependent on a new block creation?
  3. Where is the new Internet we all wanted back in 2009-2010 where millions of computer would be the network ?
https://medium.com/@Skycoinproject/cyberbalkanization-and-the-future-of-the-internets-f03f2b590c39
A) Skycoin is the bigger brother of Bitcoin. Early developers of Bitcoin knew that Miners will control the Bitcoin network in the future, so a part of them started to research a new Consensus Algorithm called Obeliskhttps://www.skycoin.net/blog/posts/obelisk-the-skycoin-consensus-algorithm/
B) Skycoin resolved 51% attack, sybil attack, has 0 TX fee, 1-2 sec for a tx , and is private. But the most important thing.
Skycoin is the only crypto out there who fixed the problem of volatility of a cryptocurrency. What's that ? Imagine if price of Skycoin goes higher and higher, peasants will ''HoDL'' it, so the term ''currency '' is lost. Why someone would spend an asset that goes higher and higher?
B1) One Skycoin kept in the wallet is creating non-stop a second currency called CoinHour. 1SKY is creating 24 CoinHours per day and so on. Coinhour is backed by bandwidth => Skywire(Software Defined Network) is the New Internet that gives Skycoin a real value, a commodity level value. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CbSdVIwr8E
B2) In this ecosystem Skycoin behaves like an equity and CoinHour is the real currency. For example Skycoin Price can reach 1 million and the price of Coinhour is independent, its equilibrium is reached by supply and demand of the market https://explorer.skycoin.net/app/blocks/1
C) Ethereum has a buggy prog language and all shitcoins are on Ethereum Blockchain (Database) with only 30 tx/s. Why would someone would gather all the data on ONE Database?!
C1) Skycoin created CX ( first deterministic cryptographic prog language) https://www.skycoin.net/blog/posts/cx-overview/
C2) Skycoin created Fiber https://www.skycoin.net/fibe ( basically you can create your own blockchain with 300-3000 tx/s, private or public , with hardware customization ( law firms, government entities and so on as early adopters)
D) Skywire is the New Internet built at the Hardware and Software level
-Skywire is hardware agnostic
-Skywire has its DYI Antennas
- Skywire has FPGA boards
-Skyiwire has 10k nodes online ( more than TOR)
Bibliography:
  1. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMAS-n0SGseIZPxWuaQVFkg
  2. https://www.skycoin.net/downloads/
  3. https://www.skycoin.net/blog/

TLDR: one neighbor is rendering a movie. He wants 1 TB/ s. He will pay CoinHour to his neighbors to borrow bandwidth capacity of their sky clusters and antennas.
Skycoin Address : 25139AGYjwGwgKMZEA268GbJyXrZGWF533i
submitted by CaptainCuc to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Dash In 2018: Disappointments, Boondoggles, Scandals, Disasters, & Catastrophes

[This post was censored in the the paidshill Dash pumping sub, where actual discussion beyond "2018 kind of sucked for Dash" is not allowed, and then re-posted here.]


Disappointments
In 2018, Dash failed to be listed on Coinbase while ETC and many other coins were, due to Dash's notorious Instamine, centralized development, and murky Howey Test/SEC Action status.
In 2018, Dash failed be included in the OpenBazaar project, while Monero and several other alts were added.
In 2018, efforts to hype Dash's supposedly impressive 2mb block-based tx/sec rate were crushed and humiliated when DCG's creaky old client hit a crippling software limitation around the same time as BCH and BSV were chewing through 32 and 64 megabyte blocks.
In 2018, Dash's former anti-segwit hero Craig Wright learned new facts about law and concluded Dash is an illegal security, saying so loudly in tweets backed by citations.
In 2018, Wirex and other debit card providers supported Bitcoin and many alts, but not Dash, despite a year of Shrem 2.0 shill talk about integrations 'soon'.
In 2018, Dash Core used Uphold for the "Acquire Dash" part of their Kript mobile plan, but Uphold doesn't work in Venezuela , so that pillar of their strategy was broken.

Boondoggles
In 2018, the FanDuel fiasco wasted a fortune in cash and goodwill, leaving Dash's target market of online gambling to Calvin Ayre's BSV and Roger Ver's BCH blockchains.
In 2018, the DACH Embassy fiasco wasted a fortune in cash and goodwill, as nobody ever really cared about Macrocuck/Simon/Basilpop/Ezra/Fabio running around desperately trying to look busy enough to justify their ridiculous burn rate and poor results.
In 2018, the CoPay fiasco wasted a fortune in cash and goodwill as users and devs suffered an ambush from DCG, leaving the formerly hyped "backbone of Evolution" project instantly retired to abandonware status.
In 2018, the Alt36 train-wreck-in-progress slowly lurched towards its imminent conclusion of causing more toxic FUD and wasting a fortune in cash and goodwill with zero deliverables to show for it.

Scandals
In 2018, fake "Venezuela adoption" news resulted in massive public humiliation as Twitter, cc, and Russia Today (ironically, the home of Dash paidshill Max Keiser) debunked hype that only amounted to useless stickers on greasy cash registers.
In 2018, Evan and Amanda were missing in action, despite Evan's previous promises to develop hardware and support the ecosystem with his vast, intentionally insta-mined fortune.
In 2018, Dash paid to hold a Bitcoin networking event at a Miami strip club, offending so many people (it was a 2nd offence for Dash with strippers at TNABC) the scandal was reported worldwide by Bloomberg, Fortue, Business Insider, etc.
In 2018, knowledge of Dash's instamine became widespread throughout the entire crypto universe and the intentional nature of Evan's faked "bug" excuse became a subject of investigation.
In 2018, Dash cargo cultists reduced themselves to shilling the dwindling number of cherry-picked metrics by which Dash was not failing utterly, such as the absurd "FairCoinValue" and fallacious/irrelevant "ATH Masternode Count" hype.
In 2018, the KuvaCash fiasco turned toxic (wasting a fortune in cash and goodwill) resulting in a kDAO splinter group of venture capitalist MNOs and creating massive Howey Test implications.

Disasters
In 2018, a KuvaNation vs. DACH Force News civil war inflicted mass casualties, leaving a permanent split of the "DGBB" community into non-cooperative Team Tao and Team Joel factions fighting over a shrinking Treasury budget like starving rats.
In 2018, malicious MNOs trolled Dash at the protocol level and on DashCentral, causing chaos at the very end of voting cycles, thus showing the entire world Dash is not resistant to Sybil attack after all.
In 2018, Dash Clown Group Inc failed to live up to its own self-imposed "Agile Development" goals so many times they published one sketchy, final "DRAFT" roadmap, and then quietly abandoned entirely the idea of actually trying to meet deadlines (despite the dash.org page still advertising a Q4 2018 Alpha release).

Catastrophes
In 2018, a single mining pool controlled enough hashpower to prevent a timely upgrade, demonstrating that Dash's PoW is not sufficiently decentralized (due to Bitmain's monopoly on Dash ASICs).
In 2018, www.crypto51.app showed the world Dash is >90% NiceHash-able and thus may be 51% attacked easily and cheaply (<1 BTC per hour), causing Poloniex and other exchanges to require 50 confirmations (rather than using InsantSend).
In 2018, the failures of Dash's X11-based PoW security model and resulting threat of attacks caused Dash to abandon Nakamoto Consensus for a wonky, untested, homespun version of checkpoints (conceding defeat and offering an unconditional "pre-consensus" surrender before an attack even happened).
In 2018, Evolution was not here by NYE (not even an alpha version of a testnet).
In 2018, no amount of brave ThisIsFine talk about buying dips could change the fact that Dash Core Group Inc had to radically downsize due to their customary $935k/month funding being completely unsupportable.

Analysis
Never mind the price drop, even though Dash suffered worse than most of its Top 20 peers and fell in rank from #3 all the way down to #16.
Let's ignore the fact Dash is marketed to investors with the 'Masternode' feature advertised as supposedly stabilizing the price.
Let's also ignore the fact that in 2018 Dash's supposed Sybil-resistance was shown to be inadequate, as blockchain analysis revealed dozens of Masternodes trolling at the protocol level by voting no on all but the infamous DEMOTE RYAN TAYLOR proposal.
Evolution was, after years of delays, complete from-scratch reboots, and blown goals, given one final self-imposed deadline to meet.
Dash's Queen, Amanda of the Used Car Lot, declared she was going have to rethink her position regarding Duff's Instamined Masternode tokens if that deadline wasn't met.
That deadline was midnight Dec 31, 2018.
Now it's the first morning of 2019 and Evolution is nowhere to be seen.
Even worse, Dash Clown Inc is once again making negative progress towards their goals of shipping a test-net version of v13 worth of the term "Release Candidate."
Dash Clown Inc burned through ten (10) un-releasable (because broken) so-called Release Candidates.
Finally the clueless clowns (running around like headless chickens since Andy Freer was fired or rage-quit) gave up on the entire v13 RC branch and went back to tinkering with v12.
No updates to the crucial LLMQ repo have been made since November, when the price drop crushed DCG's budget and Andy suddenly left Evolution to die on the operating table.

Dash in 2018 through the eyes of Reddit's most popular crypto sub

January 2018
Congratulations: Dash out of top 10
https://www.reddit.com/CryptoCurrency/comments/7oq515/congratulations_dash_out_of_top_10/
One of the most prolific scam coins has been beaten out of the top 10 once and for all. For this we can all be grateful.
Evidence for all your downvoters:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xBxbiH_Mg44
https://medium.com/@omiros23/evans-and-dash-s-scam-story-add1f16528ae
https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@thedashguy/the-reason-i-call-dash-a-scam-and-echo-chamber-proof-of-the-crazed-cult-like-thinking-of-dash-community-inside
Today is a good day.
Best comment: "replaced by Tron... oh the irony".

December 2018
KFC Venezuela denies accepting dash as a form of payment
https://www.reddit.com/CryptoCurrency/comments/a56a4e/kfc_venezuela_denies_accepting_dash_as_a_form_of/
Hi guys, check this news
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=es&sl=es&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.criptonoticias.com%2Fsucesos%2Fkfc-venezuela-desmiente-acepte-dash-como-forma-pago%2F
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccacampbell1/2018/12/07/discussions-in-place-for-dash-to-be-accepted-at-kfc-venezuela/#18baf92c5d38
https://twitter.com/dashmerchant/status/1072327769068052481
Top comment: "Yeah, more bullshit from Dash."

December 24
Dash doesn't actually look like it is being utilised by Venezuelans. Have a look.
https://www.reddit.com/CryptoCurrency/comments/a96i3y/dash_doesnt_actually_look_like_it_is_being/
https://youtu.be/4tKvqj3U3O0
Most controversial comment: "I dont see how people dont get it. If you cant pay for food, you would invest what little you have into something as risky as crypto ? It is easy to judge from our POV but In reality, most would rather feed their familiy then look for ways to invest in some startup."

Conclusion
The Top Three Dash-related posts at cryptocurrency are a microcosm of Dash's start-to-finish miserable, horrible, terrible year of self-inflicted blunders, money pits, and epoch-ending cataclysms cumulating in the resolution of the Dash experiment and disproving Evan's "Dash is Digital Cash" hypothesis.
submitted by DashNews to DashUncensored [link] [comments]

How to Staking on Harmony

Staking-based Deepsharding
Validator Registration
Sybil attack prevention is a key security consideration in public blockchains. Bitcoin and Ethereum require the miners to compute a cryptographic puzzle (PoW) before they can propose a block. Similarly, sharding-based blockchains like Zilliqa or Quarkchain also use PoW to prevent Sybil attacks. Harmony adopts a different approach with proof-of-stake (PoS) as the validator registration or Sybil attack prevention mechanism. In order to become a Harmony validator, prospective participants (or stakers) have to stake a certain amount of tokens to be eligible. The number of tokens staked will determine the number of voting shares assigned to the validator. Each voting share corresponds to one vote in the BFT consensus.
A voting share is a virtual ticket that allows a validator to cast one vote in the consensus. Validators can acquire voting shares by staking tokens. The amount of tokens required for a voting share is algorithmically adjusted. At the beginning of each epoch, new validators’ voting shares will be randomly assigned to shards. The new validators join the shard(s) where their voting shares get assigned. As discussed in §2, the consensus in a shard is reached by validators who collectively possess at least 2 f + 1 voting shares to sign the block.
To guarantee the security of a single shard, the amount of voting shares by malicious validators needs to be kept below 31 of all the voting shares in that shard. This is required due to the nature of BFT consensus. Harmony’s adaptive thresholded PoS guarantees the above security requirement by adaptively adjusting the price of a voting share and assigning individual voting shares to shards rather than individual validators.
submitted by aerios01 to CryptocurrencyICOs [link] [comments]

Harmony One Use PoS As Validator Registrations

Staking-based Sharding Validator Registration Sybil attack prevention is a key security consideration in public blockchains. Bitcoin and Ethereum require the miners to compute a cryptographic puzzle (PoW) before they can propose a block. Similarly, sharding-based blockchains like Zilliqa or Quarkchain also use PoW to prevent Sybil attacks.

Harmony adopts a different approach with proof-of-stake (PoS) as the validator registration or Sybil attack prevention mechanism. In order to become a Harmony validator, prospective participants (or stakers) have to stake a certain amount of tokens to be eligible. The number of tokens staked will determine the number of voting shares assigned to the validator.

Each voting share corresponds to one vote in the BFT consensus. A voting share is a virtual ticket that allows a validator to cast one vote in the consensus. Validators can acquire voting shares by staking tokens. The amount of tokens required for a voting share is algorithmically adjusted. At the beginning of each epoch, new validators’ voting shares will be randomly assigned to shards. The new validators join the shard(s) where their voting shares get assigned. As discussed in §2, the consensus in a shard is reached by validators who collectively possess at least 2 f + 1 voting shares to sign the block.
To guarantee the security of a single shard, the amount of voting shares by malicious validators needs to be kept below 31 of all the voting shares in that shard. This is required due to the nature of BFT consensus. Harmony’s adaptive thresholded PoS guarantees the above security requirement by adaptively adjusting the price of a voting share and assigning individual voting shares to shards rather than individual validators.
Website https://harmony.one/
submitted by jamisky to Crypto_ICO_Investing [link] [comments]

Harmony One Staking System

Staking-based Sharding Validator Registration Sybil attack prevention is a key security consideration in public blockchains. Bitcoin and Ethereum require the miners to compute a cryptographic puzzle (PoW) before they can propose a block. Similarly, sharding-based blockchains like Zilliqa or Quarkchain also use PoW to prevent Sybil attacks. Harmony adopts a different approach with proof-of-stake (PoS) as the validator registration or Sybil attack prevention mechanism. In order to become a Harmony validator, prospective participants (or stakers) have to stake a certain amount of tokens to be eligible. The number of tokens staked will determine the number of voting shares assigned to the validator. Each voting share corresponds to one vote in the BFT consensus. A voting share is a virtual ticket that allows a validator to cast one vote in the consensus. Validators can acquire voting shares by staking tokens. The amount of tokens required for a voting share is algorithmically adjusted. At the beginning of each epoch, new validators’ voting shares will be randomly assigned to shards. The new validators join the shard(s) where their voting shares get assigned. As discussed in §2, the consensus in a shard is reached by validators who collectively possess at least 2 f + 1 voting shares to sign the block. To guarantee the security of a single shard, the amount of voting shares by malicious validators needs to be kept below 31 of all the voting shares in that shard. This is required due to the nature of BFT consensus. Harmony’s adaptive thresholded PoS guarantees the above security requirement by adaptively adjusting the price of a voting share and assigning individual voting shares to shards rather than individual validators.
For more information: https://harmony.one/
submitted by Jenniharps to ico [link] [comments]

Misconceptions about Hashpower and Chain Validity

This post makes the case that it is fallacious to use hashpower as the determining factor for or against competing consensus rules within Bitcoin or between competing versions of the software.
Background
The issue of whether or not hashpower determines chain validity has been a hot issue ever since miner signalling and node count sparked controversy during the early days of the blocksize civil war back in 2015/2016.
Some level of support arose for alternative clients like Bitcoin-XT and Bitcoin Classic that favored immediate hard-forked blocksize increases. Detractors of the new clients eschewed the software, and pointed to the minority node count and hashpower backing them.
It soon became undeniable that node counts were easily faked, which made them highly unreliable as a stand-alone metric, and the discussion shifted toward hashpower, which cannot be sybilled.
Later on, there was a substantial amount of hashpower signalling for Bitcoin Unlimited, a continuation of the XT and Classic effort toward bigger blocks. Some proponents of BU pointed to the majority hashpower as evidence that it was the path the network should take, with many citing the whitepaper to back up this claim. Similar arguments arose for Segwit2x after Bitcoin Unlimited demonstrated its unreliability as a client. Many rejected this claims, declaring that users decide and miners follow, not vice versa.
Fast forward a year or two, and things are different. BCH (as well as many other clients) split off from BTC (taking many supporters of BU with it), and there are many separate chains claiming to be a type of Bitcoin. One of the arguments used by some BTC proponents today is that the longest chain by PoW determines which is the correct chain.
Detractors of BTC now cry hypocrisy - hashpower was rejected as a measure for choosing new rules, so why can it be used to legitimize one set of rules over another?
I submit that both sides miss the point.
The Whitepaper in Context
Many individuals love to mine quotes from the whitepaper in an attempt to bolster their position. I think this is foolish for the obvious fact that Satoshi wasn't infallible, made mistakes, and (quite understandably) failed to predict several highly relevant phenomena that emerged after his disappearance.
Despite this, let's humor those who tend to treat the paper as canon. As far as I can tell, there are two relevant sections from the whitepaper:
The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an attacker would have to redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower attacker catching up diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added.
and
Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proof-of-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one.
It should be quite clear from the context that longest chain by PoW as a metric for which is the "correct one" refers specifically to competing chains of the same ruleset. It's a method help users of the same Bitcoin to stay on the same chain.
Nothing in the paper makes any sort of reference to using hashpower or PoW when updating the rules or choosing between two different existing rulesets.
Causation Confusion and Subjectivity
But let's say that (like myself) you're less doctrinal and more pragmatic, and think we needn't bother consulting the whitepaper to settle disputes.
Can we still use hashpower as a metric for either cause? I'd call it tangential, at best.
Let's start with the case of determining new rules for a single network, as the situation was back before the Bitcoin hardforks began?
Sure, the entire mining community could signal for a certain new rule, and then roll out a fork to apply it. The rest of the community couldn't really stop them. Indeed, many might even choose to follow them. But mining hashpower has no power to decide for everyone else in the case of a dispute. If the Bitcoin economy doesn't like the new rules, they can opt to follow a chain without them. If that chain is supported by a greater portion of the economy, then its tokens will see their price rise. And the hashpower will inevitably follow.
So you can use hashpower to indicate which chain is considered valid according to the economic size of its supporters, but it has to be acknowledged that this is an effect, not a cause.
It's even easier to demonstrate between competing chains. Hashpower follows price. And the price gets set by the market, which should, at least in the long run, be determined by economic usefulness. In this case, hashpower will closely follow market sentiment. So hashpower can be used, but really only as a indicator of what most of the market thinks.
And if we're fighting over nomenclature, it's only really useful if your definition of "Bitcoin" is "what most of the market thinks it is". Though most people will only agree with that if the market agrees with their personal views at a given time. :)
TLDR: "Hashpower Determines Which Chain is Bitcoin" only applies keeping consensus among competing chains with the same ruleset. It is an entirely irrelevant concept to naming disputes between competing cryptocurrencies with differing rulesets.
submitted by makriath to BitcoinDiscussion [link] [comments]

Harmony Staking System

Staking-based Sharding
Validator Registration
Sybil attack prevention is a key security consideration in public blockchains. Bitcoin and Ethereum require the miners to compute a cryptographic puzzle (PoW) before they can propose a block. Similarly, sharding-based blockchains like Zilliqa or Quarkchain also use PoW to prevent Sybil attacks. Harmony adopts a different approach with proof-of-stake (PoS) as the validator registration or Sybil attack prevention mechanism. In order to become a Harmony validator, prospective participants (or stakers) have to stake a certain amount of tokens to be eligible. The number of tokens staked will determine the number of voting shares assigned to the validator. Each voting share corresponds to one vote in the BFT consensus.
A voting share is a virtual ticket that allows a validator to cast one vote in the consensus. Validators can acquire voting shares by staking tokens. The amount of tokens required for a voting share is algorithmically adjusted. At the beginning of each epoch, new validators’ voting shares will be randomly assigned to shards. The new validators join the shard(s) where their voting shares get assigned. As discussed in §2, the consensus in a shard is reached by validators who collectively possess at least 2 f + 1 voting shares to sign the block.
To guarantee the security of a single shard, the amount of voting shares by malicious validators needs to be kept below 31 of all the voting shares in that shard. This is required due to the nature of BFT consensus. Harmony’s adaptive thresholded PoS guarantees the above security requirement by adaptively adjusting the price of a voting share and assigning individual voting shares to shards rather than individual validators.
For more information: https://harmony.one/
submitted by wealthspy to altercoin [link] [comments]

ANON will have Masternodes (MN's), for the community.

So, you've been trading coins – and have heard of Masternodes, but it all seems too techy and complicated. Lets change that!
"ANON is staying true to the ethos of low-barrier to entry".
Staying authentic to the ideals of decentralization, ANON would like to bring the community into the deeper levels of blockchain. Until now only 'whales' have been able to run masternodes – which gives control to a small band of individuals. ANON would like to see the wider community get more involved in the ecosystems of cryptocurrencies in general. Crypto is about more than trading coins. It is a way for all of us to participate in new, fairer economy.
Masternode notes:
Basics
A Masternode, in simple terms, is a node or computer wallet that has the full copy of the blockchain available 24/7 in real-time.
However, they perform several other functions apart from just keeping the full blockchain and relaying blocks/transactions as a full node does.
Some of the special functions that these nodes perform are:
Masternodes are not standalone, they are always communicating with other nodes to make a decentralized network.
Masternodes can be run by anyone that passes the barrier to entry. The entry barrier is what one needs to commit or collateralize to run a masternode. In ANON's case, 100 ANON is required. The purpose of this is to ensure that the network is supported by good actors, by asking MN operators to have 'skin in the game'.
To operate a Masternode, you will need the following:
For an intermediate guide to MN's, try this Medium article.
From the ANON Whitepaper:
As the debate rages between Proof of Work and Proof of Stake, ANON decided on a nice middle ground of Proof of Work with masternodes, coupled with zk-SNARKs technology. Staking will allow both miners and masternode holders to be rewarded for their contributions to the network. A collateral amount of 100 coins will be required to maintain a masternode on the ANON network. The distribution of the block reward will be 65% to the miners and 35% to the masternodes.
In the interest of incentivizing this network, upon launch, ANON supports masternodes which are able to earn rewards over time by simply offering full node services and posting a stake as a measure against sybil attacks. However, ANON has learned from the history of projects such as DASH and noted the numerous unforeseen complications and security risks that arise from masternodes having too much sway over a peer to peer network. Indeed the point of masternodes in ANON is to bolster the peer to peer network, not render the entire concept of a “peer” moot by creating a hierarchical structure.
With this in mind beyond earning rewards for staking their coins and thereby removing them from the circulating supply while bolstering the network, masternode functions will be limited to highly flexible but unexploitable voting schemes which can be leveraged for measuring consensus amongst stakeholders in the ecosystem for any variable number of proposals.
From the ANON FAQ
Can we have a video of Sam demonstrating how to do the set-up for ANON masternode? Sam was thrilled to have been asked by the community to make a video showing how to set-up an ANON masternode, and has agreed to make one. We will also be releasing a written step-by-step guide on how to set-up your masternode.
Will ANON masternodes have penalties, and if so how will these work? Yes, ANON masternodes will have penalties. Masternodes must always hold (N) collateral at all times and consistently be online, 24/7. The penalty for violating this condition would be dropping to the bottom of the block reward list.
Why was 100 ANON selected as the collateral for a Masternode and wouldn’t this low requirement pose economic ROI issues given the cost of hosting a VPS per node? - Sam Abbasi, our inhouse crypto-economist, explains: The objective that Jake first had when he came to us (Bushido Labs) with the idea for masternodes, was a low barrier to entry that is accessible to everyone. I am a firm believer that it does not make a difference what the collateral is (within the range we were considering) because if there are too many people on the network, people will drop out and it will simply balance out in the long run. In economics, we talk about the short run and long run, and to me the long run is more important in this case. In the long run, the collateral amount really doesn’t make much of a difference, what is more important is the block reward, which will balance out in the end. Due to this low barrier, early on we expect to see a high number of users prop up masternodes. But as the competition to get the reward grows because of the increased number of masternodes, and the probability they will get a block reward is lower, people will drop out. This will consolidate itself regardless of what the masternode collateral is. If we upped the collateral, it would be targeting larger investors, which wasn’t the community run coin Jake first envisioned. After running multiple tests with different collateral amounts we saw that the long term effects would be similar.
Will there be a Masternode rewards/payout site? Directly after the fork we will be working on putting up our masternode explorers. On our masternode explorer you will be able to see how many masternodes are on the network and are currently running, the last masternode that was paid, who was paid on what block and more. We will also incorporate some statistics on the average payout in coins, per day, per month, per year.
Are there any plans to list on advertising sites such as ‘masternodes.pro’? Yes, we plan on listing ANON on various advertising sites as we get closer to September 10th. These listing fees have already been factored into our marketing budget.
Will there be supernodes on the roadmap like ZenCash? We will consider changes to all code through our governance system (Masternodes), but at this time we are not considering future node hierarchy. All nodes are created equal. We intentionally did not want any type of node hierarchy, like how other coins have masternodes set up, I just personally don’t think it’s a good model. If the community comes back and they submit a proposal to have different types of masternodes, then we will comply.
submitted by theBigKingsman to AnonymousBitcoin [link] [comments]

New to /r/Hashgraph? Please read this post first! [FAQ & Resource Links]

Welcome to the official Hashgraph subreddit. Hashgraph is a data structure and consensus algorithm that is faster, fairer, and more secure than blockchain.
Please find our FAQ and a directory of resources below.
 
#GENERAL FAQ#
1: How does it work?
Hashgraph uses two special techniques (1) Gossip about Gossip and (2) Virtual Voting to achieve fast, fair and secure consensus.
Gossip is a well-known computer science term, which can be defined as calling any random node and telling that node everything you know, that it does not know. In distributed ledger technology, the “baseline” or minimum bandwidth required is that the transactions go to every node. A gossip protocol can achieve this transfer of information / syncing process exponentially fast. Gossip about Gossip refers to attaching a small additional amount of information to this Gossip / transaction payload, which are two hashes containing the last two people talked to (hence, gossiping about the information gossiped). Using this information, a Hashgraph can be built and constantly updated as more information is gossiped, on each node.
Once the Hashgraph is built, it is extremely easy to know what a node would vote, because we know what each node knows, and when they knew it. We now can use this data as an input to a 30 year old voting algorithm (which have strong security guarantees, maths proofs of being Asynchronous Byzantine Fault Tolerant but typically lack the speed necessary for real world implementation), and know which transactions have reached consensus quickly.
The result of using this methodology is that we get the benefit of 30 year old voting algorithms which have have strong math proofs of being Asynchronous Byzantine Fault Tolerant (meaning that we know when we will achieve consensus, guaranteed, and our math proofs make no assumptions about the speed of the internet, due to firewalls, ddos attacks, viruses or botnets), speed (due to use of a gossip protocol) and fair ordering and time stamping on every event.
2: How is Hashgraph different?
There are five different approaches to reaching distributed consensus. Firstly we have Proof-of-Work, which started with Bitcoin. The second is leader-based systems like PBFT, Raft, and Paxos. Then there is economy-based, commonly referred to as Proof-of-Stake, where forgers stake cryptocurrency on votes in order to reach consensus. Then, there’s voting-based which are too slow to be used in real systems. Finally there’s Hashgraph, which uses virtual voting and is incredibly efficient because it does not actually send any votes over the internet.
3: What is bank-grade consensus?
Hashgraph is the only bank-grade consensus algorithm as a result of the following properties: Mathematical proof of asynchronous Byzantine fault tolerance; Resilience to DDoS attacks, network partitions, sybil attacks and firewall/virus attacks; and Mathematical proof of fairness of ordering, access, and timestamps.
4: Is there a cryptocurrency?
Hashgraph is not currently available on a public network / ledger so there is no cryptocurrency at this time. We have not yet announced our plans for a public ledger, but please stay tuned for updates.
5: Why is Hashgraph patented?
Hashgraph is currently only available on a private network so its patents allow for market advantage in enterprise / commercial applications. This is not designed to stifle creativity or expansion of the emerging ecosystem, but to protect technological innovations that took years to develop.
6: How do I use Hashgraph?
If you want to use Hashgraph on a private network, you can apply for an enterprise / commercial license by contacting Swirlds.
7: What is the different between Hashgraph and Swirlds?
Hashgraph is the technology. Swirlds is the organization responsible for handling the licensing of Hashgraph.
8: Is Hashgraph better than blockchain?
The pitching of Hashgraph against Blockchain is a sensationalist angle that we do not endorse. While we do have some advantages over Blockchain based consensus, our intention is not at all to diminish the significance of Blockchain technology. We consider Blockchain to be like a capable older brother who graciously paved the way by bringing the power of Distributed Ledger Technology to the light of day, for which we are very grateful. Articles, talks etc pitching us against Blockchain are not written by us, nor are we generally consulted before articles go live. There is no reason that blockchain and Hashgraph couldn’t live together. While it is true that we have won some enterprise use cases against Blockchain based solutions (CULedger & Swirlds launch Hashgraph technology partnership), blockchain has a massive network effect which we definitely admire and respect. We respect and value the work and efforts of all developers and scientists in the Blockchain space. We also understand that Hashgraph is less well-known and nascent. That being said, every great movement has to start from somewhere and if you are reading this, it has potentially (hopefully) started with you too.
9: How can I get involved?
If you want to contact us for support or participation, please reach out to [email protected]. You can find more informational resources on the website homepage, where you can also sign up to our mailing list and/or follow us on social media. The Hashgraph Community Telegram Channel is also a great place to ask technical questions.
 
SPEED
10: How fast is Hashgraph?
It’s fast. Very fast. But you don’t have to trust us. We will release formal performance results soon, and at the same time provide the software you can use to validate the results for yourself.
Simply providing the number of transactions per second is meaningless unless all of the details are provided as well: number of nodes, bandwidth, latency, CPU, size of transaction, etc. Our performance results will provide the details needed to characterize results for a range of settings.
11: Does Hashgraph have transaction fees?
Instead of some small subset of participants being responsible for validating transactions and adding to the ledger (like miners in blockchain), all nodes contribute. Consequently, there is less need to incentivize through fees. Transaction fees are therefore expected to be very small, thereby making Hashgraph viable for micropayments.
 
SECURITY
12: What are the major security risks of distributed ledger technologies?
For a DLT, the security risks are an attacker:
13: Where do the main security risks originate?
The security risks specific to DLTs come from both internal and external attacks. An internal threat can include a computer in the network that is infected with a virus or worm other malware, or is run by a malicious party, or honest corporation that has a malicious insider with access to the computer.
An external threat can include a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, where the attacker floods one or more computers with enough messages to temporarily shut it down. Another external attack is if an adversary owns a firewall surrounding some of the nodes in the network, which it can use to block or delay messages.
14: What is Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)?
There are a variety of consensus algorithms and each offer different features and characteristics. A consensus algorithm is characterized as BFT if it guarantees a moment in time where all participants reach consensus, know that consensus has been reached, and they are never wrong. This can be contrasted with consensus algorithms based on PoW, where participants slowly become more and more confident that consensus is near, but may still not be correct. There are different levels of BFT, depending on the sorts of assumptions made about the network and transmission of messages. The strongest type of BFT is asynchronous BFT. Hashgraph is unique in supporting highest degree of BFT while still being very efficient.
15: What is Asynchronous BFT?
When a system is asynchronous BFT, it allows for malicious actors controlling the network, deleting or slowing down messages of their choosing. The only assumption made is that less than ⅓ are attackers, and some messages eventually get transmitted over the internet. Some systems are partially asynchronous, which are secure only if the attackers do not have too much power and do not manipulate the timing of messages too much. For instance, a partially asynchronous system could prove Byzantine under the assumption that messages get passed over the internet in ten seconds. This assumption ignores the reality of botnets, distributed denial of service attacks, and malicious firewalls. If unable to meet the criteria of asynchronous BFT, it is preferable that they be asynchronous less-than-Byzantine, rather than less-than-asynchronous Byzantine. In other words, they should prove they are somewhat secure in the real world instead of proving they are very secure in a fantasy world.
16: How does Hashgraph prevent Sybil attacks?
A Sybil attack refers to an attempt to compromise a network through the creation of large numbers of spurious identities – these are directed to act in collusion to inappropriately impact the network. Sybil attacks are a particular concern for public DLTs in which no special permissions are required to become a node. Protection against Sybil attacks can be provided by appropriately allocating and weighting votes of different nodes. Hashgraph can be deployed in a number of different vote weighting models, e.g. votes could be weighted by a node’s stake in some currency, or its ability to perform some work, or its willingness to risk some value. A more detailed explanation can be found at here.
17: How does Hashgraph prevent DDoS attacks?
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack occurs when it is possible to disrupt the flow of transactions for the entire network by targeting a single or a few computers. Different DLTs vary in their vulnerability to DDoS. Leader-based systems give special permissions to a particular node and are highly susceptible because the current leader is a bottleneck and is vulnerable to being targeted in the DDoS. Even if the role of the leader rotates amongst nodes, other nodes necessarily know the current leader, and so could direct a DDoS. PoW systems are resilient to DDoS because it’s difficult to predict which miner will solve the inverse hash and publish a block. Consequently, the attacker would not know which miner should be targeted. Hashgraph doesn’t use PoW, but neither does it have a Leader. So Hashgraph provides DDoS resilience without the inefficiency and cost of PoW.
 
FAIRNESS
18: What is fairness?
Fairness refers to the ability of DLTs to prevent the ordering of transactions from being unduly manipulated. Hashgraph is fair in that it serializes all transactions with cryptographic timestamping, unlike blockchains where miners determine the order in which transactions are placed within each block. In certain use cases, the transaction order is important. Consider for instance two different people purchasing shares in a stock – the first order to go through will likely get a cheaper price. Hashgraph orders transactions according to the median timestamp of when the population of nodes received them – thereby ensuring they are recorded fairly.
 
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT KIT (SDK)
19: How can I get started developing applications?
Download the SDK and follow the instructions detailed included in the /docs folder, or visit our online version here.
In order to develop a commercial application on Hashgraph using the Swirlds SDK, you will need to contact Swirlds to discuss the appropriate licensing that is required. However, you do not need to ask for permission before downloading the SDK to build small scale, non-commercial applications for personal use and experiment.
20: Why is the platform and SDK written in Java?
Java is a general purpose programming language with a large open source ecosystem and resources for developer support. There are also advantageous security measures in the Java development environment, such as sandboxing, that will allow the platform in the future to run untrusted applications, while protecting the user and their hard drive from those applications.
21: Can I develop applications in other languages?
In addition to Java, we also want the option for developers who would like to develop in other programming languages, such as Python or JavaScript. This is part of the Hashgraph development roadmap.
22: Is there a Developer Chat?
Yes, currently it is on Telegram, but will be likely moving to a new place, as our community sees fit.
 
Main links:
Whitepapers / Technical Documents:
Articles & News:
Videos:
Audios:
Hashgraph Social Links:
For general enquiries please email: [email protected]
submitted by ollybolton to hashgraph [link] [comments]

OMG!! BITCOIN $936 MILLION WHALE MOVE!! BTC HIDDEN BULLISH ... BITCOIN HALVING!!! 🚀 IGNORE Short-Term PRICE!! Why BTC ... 51% blockchain attacks don't happen for one reason, they are not profitable Cryptocurrency DUSTING Attack - What is it? EB70 – Chainalysis, Surveillance And The Path To Mass Panic

The 51% attack is perhaps the best-known of Bitcoin’s security vulnerabilities and it’s been on our collective radar since day 1. Bitcoin stores its transaction information in database chunks that are collectively referred to as the “blockchain.” As new transactions occur, they go into a new block on the end of the chain. Sybil and eclipse attacks take place at the peer-to-peer network level, referring to an adversary generating multiple pseudonymous identities in order to interfere with the protocol. This is one of the ways to attack the main bitcoin server from the inside and causing corruption of massive scale. Bitcoin, Blockchain & Cryptocurrency News. Advertisement; BTCm News; Contact us; Bitcoin A type of sybil attack, called the 51% attack is also practically impossible in the bitcoin network because of so many miners, it is very difficult for a single organization to control 51% of the miners. Bitcoin is the currency of the Internet: a distributed, worldwide, decentralized digital money. Unlike traditional currencies such as dollars, bitcoins are issued and managed without any central authority whatsoever: there is no government, company, or bank in charge of Bitcoin.

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OMG!! BITCOIN $936 MILLION WHALE MOVE!! BTC HIDDEN BULLISH ...

- What damage a large scale sybil attack could really do to Bitcoin ... Tim Draper predicts the price of bitcoin after the halving! - Duration: 49:17. Crypto Finder 269,599 views. The #Bitcoin halving is finally here! Why fundamentals are stronger than ever, #BTC is the best money the world has ever seen, and why I’m still massively bu... Tim Draper predicts the price of bitcoin after the halving! - Duration: 49:17. Crypto Finder 173,332 views. ... Sybil vs Eclipse Attack - Duration: 35:04. Ivan on Tech 21,224 views. #Bitcoin whale moves 101,857 $BTC!! Twelve reasons to be bullish on #BTC, $397k price target for 2030, $2 billion fake gold scandal, UK FCA lifts Wirecard re... Do you REALLY understand Bitcoin 51% Attack? Programmer explains. ... BE READY FOR THIS (btc crypto live news price today analysis prediction ta ... Sybil Attacks - Blockchain Security ...

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